- Joined
- May 18, 1997
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- 55,626
Scott Helme is a security researcher that keeps up a blog that I frequent. I came across his work when we were looking to move HardOCP to HTTPS. Last week he discussed how to revoke a Let's Encrypt "https" certificate, and this week he discusses how the revocation system is fully broken. Basically, if your key gets stolen, the system for letting everyone know it is stolen, is useless. This really needs to be fixed.
As it currently stands there is a real problem, we can't revoke certificates if someone obtains our private key. Just imagine how that will play out the next time Heartbleed comes along! One thing that you can do to try and limit the impact of a compromise is to reduce the validity period of certificates you obtain. Instead of three years go for one year or even less. Let's Encrypt only issue certificates that are valid for ninety days! With a reduced lifetime on your certificate you have less of a problem if you're compromised because an attacker has less time to abuse the certificate before it expires. Beyond this, there's very little we can do.
He has also recently tried to burn down his hotel with his Macbook charger.
As it currently stands there is a real problem, we can't revoke certificates if someone obtains our private key. Just imagine how that will play out the next time Heartbleed comes along! One thing that you can do to try and limit the impact of a compromise is to reduce the validity period of certificates you obtain. Instead of three years go for one year or even less. Let's Encrypt only issue certificates that are valid for ninety days! With a reduced lifetime on your certificate you have less of a problem if you're compromised because an attacker has less time to abuse the certificate before it expires. Beyond this, there's very little we can do.
He has also recently tried to burn down his hotel with his Macbook charger.