- Joined
- Aug 3, 2004
- Messages
- 24,455
Appears the "vibe coding" developer of Huntarr did not like someone finding many flaws in their app, considering what it handles. They claimed they worked in Cyber Security, but it seems based on what this other person found, they only thing security they worked on was how to make things IN-secure.
Their Reddit sub is now private https://www.reddit.com/r/huntarr/
They deleted their GitHub Repo, or made it private also: https://github.com/plexguide/Huntarr.io
Reddit thread
https://www.reddit.com/r/selfhosted...rr_your_passwords_and_your_entire_arr_stacks/
Security Review in full:
https://github.com/rfsbraz/huntarr-security-review
Their Reddit sub is now private https://www.reddit.com/r/huntarr/
They deleted their GitHub Repo, or made it private also: https://github.com/plexguide/Huntarr.io
Reddit thread
https://www.reddit.com/r/selfhosted...rr_your_passwords_and_your_entire_arr_stacks/
Security Review in full:
https://github.com/rfsbraz/huntarr-security-review
Other findings (21 total across critical/high/medium):
- Unauthenticated 2FA enrollment on the owner account (Critical, proven in CI): POST /api/user/2fa/setup with no session returned the actual TOTP secret and QR code for the owner account. An attacker generates a code, calls /api/user/2fa/verify, enrolls their own authenticator. Full account takeover, no password needed.
- Unauthenticated setup clear enables full account takeover (Critical, proven in CI): POST /api/setup/clear requires no auth. Returns 200 "Setup progress cleared." An attacker re-arms the setup flow, creates a new owner account, replaces the legitimate owner entirely.
- Unauthenticated recovery key generation (Critical, proven in CI): POST /auth/recovery-key/generate with {"setup_mode": true} reaches business logic with no auth check (returns 400, not 401/403). The endpoint is unauthenticated.
- Full cross-app credential exposure (Critical, proven in CI): Writing a single setting returns configuration for 10+ integrated apps. One call, your entire stack's API keys.
- Unauthenticated Plex account unlink - anyone can disconnect your Plex from Huntarr
- Auth bypass on Plex account linking via client-controlled setup_mode flag - the server skips session checks if you send {"setup_mode": true}
- Zip Slip arbitrary file write (High): zipfile.extractall() on user-uploaded ZIPs without filename sanitization. The container runs as root.
- Path traversal in backup restore/delete (High): backup_id from user input goes straight into filesystem paths. shutil.rmtree() makes it a directory deletion primitive.
- local_access_bypass trusts X-Forwarded-For headers, which are trivially spoofable - combine with the unauth settings write and you get full access to protected endpoints