I was reading a security Usenet group and found this post from someone. Care to dispute his claims?
- you can spoof filename via desktop.ini, which itself can be triggered by shell namespaces
- UAC doesn't apply to all administrative actions and is trivial to spoof; if you run as admin, it is trivial to circumvent; it provides no isolation; if a file includes a prudent application manifest or triggers the setup program detection, it won't even let you run a program without elevation
- PatchGuard makes it trivial to corrupt kernel memory just by debugging an application in usermode
- not even talking about what system access you get granted for simply presenting a DRMed media file...
- you can spoof filename via desktop.ini, which itself can be triggered by shell namespaces
- UAC doesn't apply to all administrative actions and is trivial to spoof; if you run as admin, it is trivial to circumvent; it provides no isolation; if a file includes a prudent application manifest or triggers the setup program detection, it won't even let you run a program without elevation
- PatchGuard makes it trivial to corrupt kernel memory just by debugging an application in usermode
- not even talking about what system access you get granted for simply presenting a DRMed media file...