The existence of the MCAS system caught pilots and their labor unions off guard, intensifying the scrutiny on the aircraft in the wake of the October 29 crash in Indonesia that killed everyone aboard. The system isn't mentioned in the flight crew operations manual (FCOM) that governs the master description of the aircraft for pilots and is the basis for Southwest's airline documentation and training.
"Since it operates in situations where the aircraft is under relatively high g load and near stall, a pilot should never see the operation of MCAS. As such, Boeing did not include an MCAS description in its FCOM." The explainer continues: "In this case, MCAS will trim nose as designed to assist the pilot during recover, likely going unnoticed by the pilot."
"Our plane design was shitty and the nose tends to pitch up, but don't worry we added this MCAS as a workaround. It relies on a sensor that could malfunction, and if it does malfunction the plane may try to dive into the earth, but don't worry we've got a workaround for that too: just open the breaker and kill the computer. If you're really concerned - and, I mean, why would you be? - we offer an optional warning light that will alert you to this catastrophic scenario."
Like, what?
Boeing is going to be seriously FUCKED by this fiasco. How they are financially viable today is only because of their military contracts.
have any non 3rd world airline had this issue? all the 1st world pilots i saw/heard talking about this knew how to handle/deal with it. the light being optional is stupid but so is not buying one.So where is all the people that blamed the pilots and 3rd world airlines?
have any non 3rd world airline had this issue? all the 1st world pilots i saw/heard talking about this knew how to handle/deal with it. the light being optional is stupid but so is not buying one.
That is a bit of an exaggeration. Many airlines (like Southwest) wanted the MAX to fly as close as possible to the NG with as little training as possible. The MCAS is designed to do this. It isn't necessary for flight, but then pilots would have more down time learning new flight characteristics. If I recall, even when the NG came out, Southwest specified an older cockpit layout option to be more similar to the Classics. Boeing tends to build planes the customers want; obviously it didn't work out well in this case. The handling of the situation certainly wasn't ideal and some big mistakes were made largely on Boeings part though.
Airbus tends to build what they want in an attempt to one up Boeing (A380). Remember originally the A350 was supposed to be yet another A300 variant? Thankfully, demand was so poor that they did a clean sheet design and made the excellent A350.
Hardly. But yes the MAX is going to cost them big time. Airbus is largely a jobs program though and they had to get illegal subsidies to get the A350 and A380 finished. Plus they peddle a lot of decent but mediocre military products to keep afloat which are nothing more than glorified subsidies. A lot of European competitions are rigged in that they exclude non-EU countries from competing because they fully intend on awarding contracts to EU based companies. While not aviation the French army rifle contract is a good example of this.
Am I reading that right? The solution is to install the once optional blinky light that says "Maybe sensor fault, MCAS will now try to crash the plane. Good luck in the next 18 seconds pilot"
Hi All
Here's a article that I believe details how this happened. Apologies if already posted
https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace...37-max-disaster-looks-to-a-software-developer
I believe the relative ease—not to mention the lack of tangible cost—of software updates has created a cultural laziness within the software engineering community. Moreover, because more and more of the hardware that we create is monitored and controlled by software, that cultural laziness is now creeping into hardware engineering—like building airliners. Less thought is now given to getting a design correct and simple up front because it’s so easy to fix what you didn’t get right later.
Great article.
I think the gaming community especially can understand the opinion expressed here. We are (slowly) coming to know and hate this particular trend with game developers; how would you feel sitting on a plane made by people with this same mindset?
If you want a pilot's perspective on the 737 MAX MCAS problem, I would recommend watching Juan Browne's "blancolirio" channel on Youtube. Juan is a Boeing 777 pilot and has over 40 years of flying experience.
Here is just one of his videos discussing the 737 MAX and MCAS. He has more videos but I'm not going to paste them all here. Just search for them in his channel. He addresses many questions that you might have but have never seen addressed in the news.
Yes, I am pretty sure the extreme difficulty that the pilots would have experienced trying to move the trim wheels manually was mentioned in one of Juan's videos. Especially since the throttle was maxed out and the airspeed was way over normal, making the forces on the elevators much higher than normal. I believe he said the trim switches might have been re-enabled because the pilots were unable to move the trim wheel manually after switching to cutout mode. When re-enabled, the electronic trim functionality would allow them to use the yoke to move the stabilizers instead of manually via the wheel. But then, MCAS is enabled, too. And it still thinks the plane is at the wrong AOA due to the bad sensor, so every 10 seconds it adds another ~2.5 degrees of elevator angle. In the wrong direction. Catch 22 situation.Interesting assessment based upon the info available for that video. However... https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...-737-max-may-have-failed-on-ethiopian-flight/
Also additional info
https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...ax-cockpit-limiting-ability-to-shut-off-mcas/
but sure, the experience of the pilot/copilot is a contributing factor, but what do I know, only over 20year certifying DAL-A systems
Thanks for linking, That article is disgusting. Boeing fucked up big time.
Plane screen of death sounds like a bad way to go. I still think all these planes should have a big red button that turns off all automatic flight controls. Makes it fast and quick to turn it all off and not have to turn off more then one switch in a we about to die situation. Or have 3 full flight computers and sensors and if any one computer system disagrees it drops input form that system.
Plane BSOD is only bad if the pilot can't override the computer and fly the plane without them. You know...like we are trained to do.
Yes, but not just sales for Boeing.If pilots could simply learn to fly the MAX correctly then what was the purpose of Boeing implementing the MCAS - to make sales more appealing due to the "no training required" aspect?
All these articles indicate that that the design of the airplane resulted in a tendency to pitch up and stall, thus the need for this MCAS system to regulate it. They also indicate that MCAS was not covered in the flight crew operations manual.
If pilots could simply learn to fly the MAX correctly then what was the purpose of Boeing implementing the MCAS - to make sales more appealing due to the "no training required" aspect? Something doesn't add up there, because to me it sounds like shitty airplane design + workarounds + layers of corporate obfuscation by Boeing.
I think you may have misunderstood...I was knocking on Boeing for making it impossible or nearly so for the pilots to override the system. Lack of training and poor implementation are to blame for that. As a direct result of their desire to avoid recertification. The DER should have never signed off on this.
I guess my question is: without the MCAS would this plane have ever been certified? I.E. if the plan was simply "well the plane may pitch and stall but just train the pilots"?
I guess my question is: without the MCAS would this plane have ever been certified? I.E. if the plan was simply "well the plane may pitch and stall but just train the pilots"?
I guess my question is: without the MCAS would this plane have ever been certified? I.E. if the plan was simply "well the plane may pitch and stall but just train the pilots"?
.I guess my question is: without the MCAS would this plane have ever been certified? I.E. if the plan was simply "well the plane may pitch and stall but just train the pilots"?
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Others have already answered about the type rating and training
So I will just answer the technical reason why MCAS is required
As per Peter Lemme, the Speed Trim System, which includes MCAS aids in damping PHUGOID
.
Others have already answered about the type rating and training
So I will just answer the technical reason why MCAS is required
As per Peter Lemme, the Speed Trim System, which includes MCAS aids in damping PHUGOID