America and Canada Ground All Boeing 737 MAX Planes

That's not true either; there are two possible steps: hit the big red button that tells the computer to stop it and a guarded circuit breaker that kills the power if the button didn't work. Flip the guard, stab the button and get back to work.

Source: An Air Canada pilot that flies these planes.

Finally someone who is a pilot. So could a recent software update disable or change commands inadvertently of the "big red button" that tells the computer to stop? Are their any fail safes in the software?

From a google search, software probably played a role in these crashes.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=boeing+crashes+software+updates
 
Interesting article here,

https://phys.org/news/2019-03-ethiopian-airlines-mcas-boeing-max.html

"Angle of attack sensors on the aircraft tell the MCAS to automatically point the nose of the plane down if it is in danger of going into a stall.
This is done through horizontal stabilizers on the plane's tail which are activated by the aircraft's flight control computer".


Thing is , I heard reports from people saying that there was smoke coming from the tail of the plane before it went down.
 
Finally someone who is a pilot. So could a recent software update disable or change commands inadvertently of the "big red button" that tells the computer to stop? Are their any fail safes in the software?

From a google search, software probably played a role in these crashes.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=boeing+crashes+software+updates

My source is an actual pilot; our mutual friend is a retired pilot whose trip to Florida's itinerary got shat upon. All involved are not thrilled with the half-assed journalism surrounding this. The only other information I was able to glean was:

- Moving the engines forward on the fuselage should have helped reduced stalling; mitigated by the lengthening of the fuselage to accommodate the upgrade
- Software is updated constantly with various side-effects
- Training is 9 weeks in the box; stall conditions are covered as is 'lights out' piloting
- When the big red button doesn't work (and a software update could cause that to happen) you are to a) flip the guard on the relevant circuit breaker and b) operate the breaker, thereby shutting down the computer that is trying to kill you
- Pilots are to memorize the locations of both items in the rule above and do so because of how important they are.
- Pilots are very much trained that the stall warning warble means shit got real and needs to be addressd

They aren't familiar with the quality of the pilots of the airline involved but you don't generally get access to NA airspace without NA accepted credentials. This doesn't prevent a company from cheating on regional flights.

FWIW
 
Am I missing something? Looks like the trim cut off for MCAS is here:
737-max-trim-control.jpg


cockpit-Artboard_2.jpg


There is a tactile trim wheel as well, as Boeing tends to do things old school (unlike Airbus).

Unless I am missing something this looks like while the system certainly can be tweaked poor pilot training must be a big contributing factor. But I'm not an expert so maybe I am misunderstanding if that actually disables MCAS.

With Lion Air training and safety has been a big problem at least. Since their MAX 8 went down they've had one ground collision and one plane go off a runway in a few months. About a dozen crashes in under two decades of operation.
 
This is ignorant and not the issue.

My source is an actual pilot (etc)

- When the big red button doesn't work you are to a) flip the guard on the relevant circuit breaker and b) operate the breaker, thereby shutting down the computer that is trying to kill you
- Pilots are to memorize the locations of both items in the rule above and do so because of how important they are.

They aren't familiar with the quality of the pilots of the airline involved but you don't generally get access to NA airspace without NA accepted credentials. This doesn't prevent a company from cheating on regional flights.

FWIW
[Quote abbreviated to save space and emphasis added.]

The highlighted phrase above is the key part of the problem. Pilot's from third rate airlines based in third world countries are NOT trained properly on how to fly the plane, they're trained to fly the computer. When the shit hits the fan, they don't have the muscle memory to react immediately in the proper manner, because they don't fly these kinds of incidents repeatedly in the simulator, nor is their testing rigorous enough to make sure they figured it out (somehow) on their own. Not only are they poorly trained, most pilots from these crap airlines aren't nearly as experienced as those in the same positions from the US, Germany, the UK, etc. A fairly experienced pilot in the US has ~12,000 flight hours under his belt, while an experienced captain will have 17,000+. The captain of the Ethiopian crew in the most recent crash had 8000 total hours (but only 188 hours in the MAX), and the first officer only 200 total hours. That's why these 737 MAX pilots don't prevent their planes from running into the ground, even when they should be able to, regardless of what the computer wants to do.

[My sources are my father (33 year pilot for United Airlines), my brother (20 years with American), and myself (head of sales for a company that repairs and does scheduled maintenance on commercial aircraft). We've discussed this at length and the general consensus is that yes, the computer initiated the problem, but the aircraft wasn't structurally broken until it hit the ground and a good crew would have been able to overcome it.]
 
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Am I missing something? Looks like the trim cut off for MCAS is here:

As I understand it, the computer is able to override manual inputs by the pilots if it thinks (erroneously or not) that the plane is going to stall. As Todd Walter pointed out above, the solution to that is to pull the circuit breaker for the computer and fly the plane manually.
Knowing what has happened with the 737 MAX recently, the first officer should have had that circuit breaker location memorized and both pilots should have know what to do when the computer pointed them at the ground. Apparently they didn't.
 
I'm not a pilot nor do I currently work in aerospace but as a former Air Force crew chief and an aircraft buff of sorts, I know a little more than your average Joe. That being said I know how much testing goes into the development of aircraft and I can assure everyone that Boeing didn't just make a little boo boo and it's making planes fall out of the sky. The limitations of the flight envelope for this aircraft where carefully planned and while the choices made were about making profits, it wasn't at the risk of human lives. Larger aircraft have been dealing with these limitations for years. This all comes down to proper training and hands on experience. Unless there was a major mechanical failure we don't know about, you can all but guarantee this was pilot error. Personally, I wish Boeing went in a different direction and designed a whole new aircraft to fill this need, a scaled down 787 maybe... I think they over-reached with the modifications needed to extend the 737's passenger capacity.
 
I'm not a pilot nor do I currently work in aerospace but as a former Air Force crew chief and an aircraft buff of sorts, I know a little more than your average Joe. That being said I know how much testing goes into the development of aircraft and I can assure everyone that Boeing didn't just make a little boo boo and it's making planes fall out of the sky. The limitations of the flight envelope for this aircraft where carefully planned and while the choices made were about making profits, it wasn't at the risk of human lives. Larger aircraft have been dealing with these limitations for years. This all comes down to proper training and hands on experience. Unless there was a major mechanical failure we don't know about, you can all but guarantee this was pilot error. Personally, I wish Boeing went in a different direction and designed a whole new aircraft to fill this need, a scaled down 787 maybe... I think they over-reached with the modifications needed to extend the 737's passenger capacity.
It may be pilot error or shoddy/insufficient training in this case but to think no errors can get past testing is ludicrous.
Maybe one of the engineers used metric. ;)
 
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Personally, I wish Boeing went in a different direction and designed a whole new aircraft to fill this need, a scaled down 787 maybe... I think they over-reached with the modifications needed to extend the 737's passenger capacity.

That was the intent, but customers were asking for a more fuel efficient plane and Airbus was launching the A320Neo. If Boeing had no counter part they would have lost out, and a clean sheet design would have taken too long. They also ended 757 production fairly early as many airlines are buying A321Neos / LRs to replace worn out 757s. Boeing does have the 797 coming to fill the 757 and 767 area but that is also a ways off.

But yeah, essentially a CS300 (now called A220) with 3x3 would have been pretty nice to see.
 
Let's talk sensors and redundant algorithms.

We have 1 sensor, A. There is no way to tell if its input is valid. Bad design.

Add a second sensor, B. Now, if A and B agree, all is good. That's probably correct. (There are exceptions.) Now, if A =/= B, which is right? Toss a coin? Eliminate both?

Okay...now we have 3 sensors, A, B, and C. This is generally agreed to be the minimum. All 3 agree...that's easy. If any 2 agree, then the third one is assumed invalid and tossed out.

3 sensors are the minimum to have a rational check. However, there is NO redundancy. If one sensor is "bad", then the system reverts to a 2 sensor system...which is incapable of providing validated input if there is any disagreement.

In commercial use, you typically don't duplicate sensors as they typically have acceptably low failure rates. Hell, even military systems don't have that level of redundancy.

The real problem here was using inputs from sensors to take automatic corrective action in such a way that could potentially lead to loss of aircraft; this is simply unacceptable design.
 
That was the intent, but customers were asking for a more fuel efficient plane and Airbus was launching the A320Neo. If Boeing had no counter part they would have lost out, and a clean sheet design would have taken too long. They also ended 757 production fairly early as many airlines are buying A321Neos / LRs to replace worn out 757s. Boeing does have the 797 coming to fill the 757 and 767 area but that is also a ways off.

But yeah, essentially a CS300 (now called A220) with 3x3 would have been pretty nice to see.

Why would a clean sheet design have taken too long?
 
Why would a clean sheet design have taken too long?
Certification and tooling, the actual design work is the quickest part of the process.
By using an existing design they only have to certify the new bits.
 
Certification and tooling, the actual design work is the quickest part of the process.
By using an existing design they only have to certify the new bits.

Yeah. Much easier to make some improvements and roll a slightly better product out than make something from scratch. Same with every other industry really. Same reason the A320Neo exists. It was easier and quicker.
 
Maybe someone who actually works in this area will call this BS but I believe it.
A buddy of mine who works for a company that makes parts that are on pretty much every jet engine out there told me that on the first engine tear downs after a new engine design went into service they were finding cracked bolts.
They were still strong enough to hold the load but the safety factor was below acceptable limits.
They determined that the bolts needed to be checked and replaced between tear downs as a temporary fix until the problem was fixed which the operators hated... big $$$$ lost when the planes were not flying.
It was determined to change the material and heat treatment of the bolts would fix the problem.
It took 3 years to get the new bolts certified to fly.
 
In commercial use, you typically don't duplicate sensors as they typically have acceptably low failure rates. Hell, even military systems don't have that level of redundancy.

The real problem here was using inputs from sensors to take automatic corrective action in such a way that could potentially lead to loss of aircraft; this is simply unacceptable design.

In commercial use, you certainly DO duplicate sensors. Military systems frequently have more. For example, the 737 has 3 "gyros". Large military aircraft (C-17) have 4. Pitot systems have 3: left/pilot, right/copilot, and standby/backup. Etc.
 
For what it's worth, the Ethiopian captain was reportedly 29 years old. His copilot had just 200 hours. A lack of experience, coupled with some sort of aircraft malfunction, are the most likely culprits. No...the aircraft should NOT malfunction...but they do. Training, experience, and readiness are counters to such events.

Flat tires happen: how many drivers lose control when that happens? Some do. Most do not.

As of right now, the causes of the Ethiopian crash are pure supposition.
 
How much testing do they go through to get approved? Could it just be coincidence?
Usually the testing is pretty extensive, and after the company does all their testing, there's usually a factory acceptance test (FAT) and site acceptance test (SAT) on the client side of the purchase. However, problems still crop up after all that. I do FAT and SAT tests all the time at work with vendor's products for the nuclear industry, and after we have things in service for a while, bizarre problems do manifest in software and hardware on occasion. Computer hardware/software based products are extremely complex and you can't test every combination of scenarios under dynamic situations. This situation with the planes does appear to be a little different with the problem of a common mode failure that should have been captured and corrected since multiple instances have been exhibited. A root cause evaluation with extent of condition needs to be performed. It may be just a training/operator error, or it could be an actual hardware/software fault.
 
https://www.foxnews.com/world/ethio...milar-to-ill-fated-lion-air-plane-report-says
Meanwhile, the Ethiopian Airlines’ black boxes that were delivered Thursday to a French air accident investigation authority, known by its French acronym BEA, have yet to be opened or examined, a source who spoke to American investigators told Fox News.

American investigators left the facility after arguments broke out over how the protocols for examination, custody and cooperation among the investigators, laid out in the UN’s International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) section 13, were being ignored, the source said.

The source also said the accident site itself was compromised because it was not secured quickly enough, allowing local to ransack it.

I'll just let that sit as I think it speaks for itself and i'm finding it hard to comment without getting political, but honestly, pretty sad...
 
What I find most worrying, is that I just saw an interview of the FAA chief and he sounded unashamedly like a Boeing spokesman - I had go back to the video to make sure I heard right and he wasn't just a Boeing corporate shill. You'd expect the aviation regulator to be all about safety, not about securing a specific manufacturers interests...
Huh, I bet the Ethiopian authorities saw things like that and decided to send the black box to Europe instead (they asked Germany first, but the Germans could not handle it, so France was next) - which seems to be unusual (if the country that had the accident is not capable, they are usually sent to the country of the manufacturer).
 
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For what it's worth, the Ethiopian captain was reportedly 29 years old. His copilot had just 200 hours. A lack of experience, coupled with some sort of aircraft malfunction, are the most likely culprits. No...the aircraft should NOT malfunction...but they do. Training, experience, and readiness are counters to such events.

Flat tires happen: how many drivers lose control when that happens? Some do. Most do not.

As of right now, the causes of the Ethiopian crash are pure supposition.
And that is worth nothing. The pilot had over 8000 hours and was one of Ethiopians best pilots. A co-pilot having low flight hours isn't unexpected because guess what ... training... Why not couple someone new with someone who is very good.
All that is (from yourself an Business insider) for bringing attention to this insiginficant nugget is a distraction.. Lets look at the facts and then YOU can tell me whether a CO-PILOT with 200hours was in anyway involved in the crash

https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-to-make-key-change-in-max-cockpit-software-11552413489 12th March
Boeing publicly released details about the planned 737 MAX software update on its website late Monday. A company spokesman confirmed the update would include a change to use multiple data feeds in MAX’s stall-prevention system—instead of the current reliance on a single sensor.

https://www.dallasnews.com/business...-complained-feds-months-suspected-safety-flaw 12th March
Several Boeing 737 Max8 pilots in US complained about suspected safety flaw

One captain even called the Max 8's flight manual "inadequate and almost criminally insufficient," according to the report.

"The fact that this airplane requires such jury-rigging to fly is a red flag. Now we know the systems employed are error-prone — even if the pilots aren't sure what those systems are, what redundancies are in place and failure modes. I am left to wonder: what else don't I know?" wrote the captain.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/pilot-...control-problems-11552473593?mod=hp_lead_pos3 13th March
The pilot “reported back to air-traffic controllers that he was having flight-control problems” and wanted to return to Addis Ababa, Mr. Gebremariam said.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/business/boeing-737-grounding-faa.html 12th March
Early Tuesday, Dennis A. Muilenburg, the chief executive of Boeing, spoke to President Trump on the phone and made the case that the 737 Max planes should not be grounded in the United States, according to two people briefed on the conversation.


https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...ion-in-max-orders-at-risk-as-airlines-retreat 14th March
Boeing is in crisis as most of the world grounded the plane. On Wednesday, U.S. regulators joined the global chorus by grounding the plane, citing evidence showing the Ethiopian Airlines flight may have experienced the same problem as the plane that went down five months ago off Indonesia.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...n-satellite-data-that-could-aid-investigation 13th March
The erratic, six-minute flight of the Ethiopian Airlines plane convinced the Federal Aviation Administration that it was close enough to what preceded the Oct. 29 crash of another Max off the coast of Indonesia to warrant concern.

After reviewing the data “it became clear -- to all parties, actually -- that the track of the Ethiopian Airlines flight was very close and behaved very similarly to the Lion Air flight,” agency Acting Administrator Daniel Elwell said Wednesday.



https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/...tion=click&module=Top Stories&pgtype=Homepage 14th March
Break break, request back to home,” the captain told air traffic controllers as they scrambled to divert two other flights approaching the airport. “Request vector for landing.”

Controllers also observed that the aircraft, a new Boeing 737 Max 8, was oscillating up and down by hundreds of feet — a sign that something was extraordinarily wrong.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...said-to-show-jet-was-set-to-dive?srnd=premium 15th March
The so-called jackscrew, used to set the trim that raises and lowers the plane’s nose, indicates the jet was configured to dive, based on a preliminary review, according to a person familiar with the investigation.

By all means focus on the low hours of the co-pilot and the "age" of the pilot
2010-05-17-facepalm-hi-res.jpg




Boeing screwed up, Boeing went full retard in lobbing to keep them in the air, FAA lost all credibility as an impartial, non-political airworthiness agency.
The longer this goes on, the more significant the head that Wall street will demand to stabilize the stock market.

The DAMAGE FAA/Boeing have done in how they handled this to the credibility of the USA as a leader in airworthiness cannot be understated. EASA are going to capitalise, just look where the blackboxes have gone


but sure, bring up the age and flight hours, obviously the significant piece of information WHEN COMPARED WITH THE DEAD PILOT FROM THE OTHER FLIGHT
 
I am a former military aviator and current airline pilot. I may have a bit of knowledge on this issue. But you go ahead and spout whatever you want, and toss a facepalm meme on it.
 
That was the intent, but customers were asking for a more fuel efficient plane and Airbus was launching the A320Neo. If Boeing had no counter part they would have lost out, and a clean sheet design would have taken too long. They also ended 757 production fairly early as many airlines are buying A321Neos / LRs to replace worn out 757s. Boeing does have the 797 coming to fill the 757 and 767 area but that is also a ways off.

But yeah, essentially a CS300 (now called A220) with 3x3 would have been pretty nice to see.

I understand that but Boeing should have considered designing, planning and testing something to replace the void left by the 757 way before it was discontinued. These larger 737 MAX aircraft are intended to fill that void and try to fill a need in between the two size classes. That coupled with the the idea that 737 NG crews could shift to the new platform with minimal training. From most of what I've read and seen, the real issue here is more than likely related to the level of training that is suggested for the new platform than the design itself. So Boeing goofed on making it "easy" to transition from the NG.
 
Wow, I wonder if naib works for EASA or Airbus. Personally, I would get on a 737 MAX 8 or 9 with a well trained (see major airline) pilot and not think twice.
 
Wow, I wonder if naib works for EASA or Airbus. Personally, I would get on a 737 MAX 8 or 9 with a well trained (see major airline) pilot and not think twice.
First off what do you consider a major airline. Pilots make mistakes all the time especially when they are tired, hungover or strung out. There are several posts in the confidential NASA data base that mention it.
The plane has a dangerous safety "feature" that has already killed over 200 people, Boeing knows about it and is issuing a fix. I'd rather take a train than fly on a Boeing 737 Max 8/9. ymmv
 
First off what do you consider a major airline. Pilots make mistakes all the time especially when they are tired, hungover or strung out. There are several posts in the confidential NASA data base that mention it.
The plane has a dangerous safety "feature" that has already killed over 200 people, Boeing knows about it and is issuing a fix. I'd rather take a train than fly on a Boeing 737 Max 8/9. ymmv

Major airlines, in the US are Delta, American Airlines, Southwest Airlines, JetBlue, Alaskan Airlines, United Airlines I probably missed one or two. Internationals carriers like Emirates, Air Canada, Lufthansa, Virgin, Qatar, Qantas, etcetera I'm sure would be fine too.

Yes, pilots make mistakes but that is why there are always two flight crew members in the cockpit on commercial flights. I am concerned about the "safety feature" and the amount of adjustment it is apparently making. My point is that a seasoned air crew can easily disable the feature and fly the aircraft. The truth is software updates and fixes happen all the time on modern aircraft. Trains kill people too, heck the most dangerous thing most of us do is get behind the wheel of a car. Statistically speaking, that is far more likely to get you killed.
 
I understand that but Boeing should have considered designing, planning and testing something to replace the void left by the 757 way before it was discontinued. These larger 737 MAX aircraft are intended to fill that void and try to fill a need in between the two size classes. That coupled with the the idea that 737 NG crews could shift to the new platform with minimal training. From most of what I've read and seen, the real issue here is more than likely related to the level of training that is suggested for the new platform than the design itself. So Boeing goofed on making it "easy" to transition from the NG.

Boeing was doing the 787 prior to that. Both Boeing and Airbus cannot develop two planes at once. The cost and time just takes too big of a toll on both of them. When they finished the 787 they got to work on the 737 MAX and 777X shortly after. Only now are they able to focus on the 797. Airbus had a similar issue. They focused on the A380 and put out another A300 based plane, the A350 which was met with such a poor reception that they had to make a new design. Because of that they were unable to make a proper 757/767 replacement themselves, and hence why the A330Neo (essentially the original A350 concept) and A320Neo exist. They simply didn't have time for a clean sheet small and medium sized plane.

In retrospect the A380 was a bad idea. Airbus would have been much better off had they went for a 797 type plane off the bat. The A321Neo is doing a decent job of filling that area but clearly the airlines wanted something else and are only going to it as there is no real option currently available. Or focused on more A350 variants. Boeing does have a better product stack, or will, in the next few years - 737, 797, 787, 777. Airbus will just have the A32*, A330Neo & A350. Sufficient to be competitive but Boeing has the niches more filled out across the board. Awesome technical achievement, but the A380 was built too soon. Maybe 30 years from now when the Earth is much more populated and more airports could accommodate them would they have made more sense economically.
 
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Boeing was doing the 787 prior to that. Both Boeing and Airbus cannot develop two planes at once. The cost and time just takes too big of a toll on both of them. When they finished the 787 they got to work on the 737 MAX and 777X shortly after. Only now are they able to focus on the 797. Airbus had a similar issue. They focused on the A380 and put out another A300 based plane, the A350 which was met with such a poor reception that they had to make a new design. Because of that they were unable to make a proper 757/767 replacement themselves, and hence why the A330Neo (essentially the original A350 concept) and A320Neo exist. They simply didn't have time for a clean sheet small and medium sized plane.

In retrospect the A380 was a bad idea. Airbus would have been much better off had they went for a 797 type plane off the bat. The A321Neo is doing a decent job of filling that area but clearly the airlines wanted something else and are only going to it as there is no real option currently available. Or focused on more A350 variants. Boeing does have a better product stack, or will, in the next few years - 737, 797, 787, 777. Airbus will just have the A32*, A330Neo & A350. Sufficient to be competitive but Boeing has the niches more filled out across the board. Awesome technical achievement, but the A380 was built too soon. Maybe 30 years from now when the Earth is much more populated and more airports could accommodate them would they have made more sense economically.

We can go back and forth for hours on this but at this point it is what it is. The 787 is a incredible technical feat albeit a little bigger than what they needed for this market. I would have gone with a revision of the 757 and a full redesign to replace the oldest actively produced design, the 737. That's just my 2 cents. As for Airbus, I think the A380 was a serious miscalculation. I think in some way it was also an attempt at putting themselves on the map, the way Boeing did with the 747. Sure the 737 is the most produced commercial aircraft in history but the 747 was the icon of flight for years.
 
We can go back and forth for hours on this but at this point it is what it is. The 787 is a incredible technical feat albeit a little bigger than what they needed for this market. I would have gone with a revision of the 757 and a full redesign to replace the oldest actively produced design, the 737. That's just my 2 cents. As for Airbus, I think the A380 was a serious miscalculation. I think in some way it was also an attempt at putting themselves on the map, the way Boeing did with the 747. Sure the 737 is the most produced commercial aircraft in history but the 747 was the icon of flight for years.

Yeah the A380 was largely to one up Boeing and be the first to beat them in a very iconic way. Airbus already had a history of firsts such as fly by wire in the A320 and the first wide body plane with two engines with the A300 but I think it wasn't quite as iconic as the 747. For a long time the 747 was the king of the long range market, but many airlines like Qantas didn't need the capacity but rather the range. Qantas is replacing some 747s with 787-9s because they simply don't need many planes with that capacity but rather the range. You'd think with the A340-600 that would have covered the long range and capacity segment until the A350. Fuel prices were already climbing at such a high rate you have to wonder why they continued with the A380. So few airports can take them and so few routes/airlines can take advantage of the density.

Really nice plane from an engineering perspective but the 747-8 was designed with the 8F in mind and that is why it will be around for a while even if the passenger planes disappear within the decade. Airbus would have been better off focusing on the hypothetical A350-"1100" to take on the 777X.
 
I am a former military aviator and current airline pilot. I may have a bit of knowledge on this issue. But you go ahead and spout whatever you want, and toss a facepalm meme on it.
You are not the only one that has knowledge in this field. What takes time is finding a publically citable editorial as I can't start stating report numbers which are not... But sure keep blaming the co-pilot with 200hours

https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-0...an-Airlines-Flight-302-Accident-Investigation
First and foremost, our deepest sympathies are with the families and loved ones of those onboard Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302.

Boeing continues to support the investigation, and is working with the authorities to evaluate new information as it becomes available. Safety is our highest priorityas we design, build and support our airplanes. As part of our standard practice following any accident, we examine our aircraft design and operation, and when appropriate, institute product updates to further improve safety.

While investigators continue to work to establish definitive conclusions, Boeing is finalizing its development of a previously-announced software update and pilot training revision that will address the MCAS flight control law's behavior in response to erroneous sensor inputs.

We also continue to provide technical assistance at the request of and under the direction of the National Transportation Safety Board, the U.S. Accredited Representative working with Ethiopian investigators.

In accordance with international protocol, all inquiries about the ongoing accident investigation must be directed to the investigating authorities.

As I said... Flawed architecture if such a concept relied on a single sensor. The MCAS should have been classed as a DAL-A system as well as subject to ARP4754 and DO178. Somewhere during the PDR it should have been strongly noted that erroneous data could cause the MCAS to inappropriately act.

This is an architectural problem coupled with poor training as apparently the MCAS wasn't covered (or lightly covered) in the refresher for the 737-max8.

But sure, you keep clinging to co-pilot, when there are "clear similarities" between the two crash's and the pilot radioed home wanting a turn-around
 
My source is an actual pilot; our mutual friend is a retired pilot whose trip to Florida's itinerary got shat upon. All involved are not thrilled with the half-assed journalism surrounding this. The only other information I was able to glean was:

- Moving the engines forward on the fuselage should have helped reduced stalling; mitigated by the lengthening of the fuselage to accommodate the upgrade
- Software is updated constantly with various side-effects
- Training is 9 weeks in the box; stall conditions are covered as is 'lights out' piloting
- When the big red button doesn't work (and a software update could cause that to happen) you are to a) flip the guard on the relevant circuit breaker and b) operate the breaker, thereby shutting down the computer that is trying to kill you
- Pilots are to memorize the locations of both items in the rule above and do so because of how important they are.
- Pilots are very much trained that the stall warning warble means shit got real and needs to be addressd

They aren't familiar with the quality of the pilots of the airline involved but you don't generally get access to NA airspace without NA accepted credentials. This doesn't prevent a company from cheating on regional flights.

FWIW
Did your friend actually fly a MAX or merely another 737 variant?

Boeings focus on keeping the MAX as a type certification seems to be the key as to why many pilots, who actively fly MAXs up until they were grounded and their unions, publicly disagree with your friends assessment and said they didn't even know MCAS existed. The training requirements when switching types is vastly different than staying within the variants; specifically saving millions on no simulator time was a huge selling point. It's rapidly becoming obvious that the MAX should have required a whole new type cert, but that would have likely killed many sales due to a significant cost increase (testing and training) as well as a very long delay (beyond the 9mths they were already behind).

This article was about the first crash and timing makes it relevant as it was the result of a local paper investigating the issue. https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/

If even half of that is true, Boeing cut a lot of corners in order to stay competitive with AirBus and the FAA went along for the ride to protect American jobs or something.

Edit: There's a whole spectrum between honest errors and outright malfeasance. It remains to be seen where this falls on the spectrum, but at the very least it appears that a lot of compromises were made and possibly corners cut to meet other, non-safety based requirements/constraints.
 
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Did your friend actually fly a MAX or merely another 737 variant?

Boeings focus on keeping the MAX as a type certification seems to be the key as to why many pilots, who actively fly MAXs up until they were grounded and their unions, publicly disagree with your friends assessment and said they didn't even know MCAS existed. The training requirements when switching types is vastly different than staying within the variants; specifically saving millions on no simulator time was a huge selling point. It's rapidly becoming obvious that the MAX should have required a whole new type cert, but that would have likely killed many sales due to a significant cost increase (testing and training) as well as a very long delay (beyond the 9mths they were already behind).

This article was about the first crash and timing makes it relevant as it was the result of a local paper investigating the issue. https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/

If even half of that is true, Boeing cut a lot of corners in order to stay competitive with AirBus and the FAA went along for the ride to protect American jobs or something.

Edit: There's a whole spectrum between honest errors and outright malfeasance. It remains to be seen where this falls on the spectrum, but at the very least it appears that a lot of compromises were made and possibly corners cut to meet other, non-safety based requirements/constraints.

Yes, this was 9 weeks simulation training on the Max to cover the differences relative to the original. He knew MCAS existed and how to deal with it. He flies for Air Canada.
 
Yes, this was 9 weeks simulation training on the Max to cover the differences relative to the original. He knew MCAS existed and how to deal with it. He flies for Air Canada.
Seems like Air Canada did a great job there (although I'm confused by the verb tense since you previously said he was retired).

However, that is not how Boeing marketed the plane, nor how most airlines actually trained their pilots...even in the USA. Unless all the other pilots for United, Southwest, Delta and their unions are lying.
 
Seems like Air Canada did a great job there (although I'm confused by the verb tense since you previously said he was retired).

However, that is not how Boeing marketed the plane, nor how most airlines actually trained their pilots...even in the USA. Unless all the other pilots for United, Southwest, Delta and their unions are lying.

Our mutual friend is retired. The AC pilot is still active. FWIW, the expense of the training was noted. The duration also suggests a slow rotation through the ranks, but he made no comment on that.
 
Seems like Air Canada did a great job there (although I'm confused by the verb tense since you previously said he was retired).

However, that is not how Boeing marketed the plane, nor how most airlines actually trained their pilots...even in the USA. Unless all the other pilots for United, Southwest, Delta and their unions are lying.

I'm unfamiliar with how they marketed the plane. Considering that airlines will try and spin the wings falling off as pilot error it doesn't surprise me that the unions' would be redirecting blame.
 
I'm unfamiliar with how they marketed the plane. Considering that airlines will try and spin the wings falling off as pilot error it doesn't surprise me that the unions' would be redirecting blame.
It was covered in various flying journals, airshows, market analysis, etc...years ago. IIRC, no required simulator time was a huge selling point and analysts considered it a major reason Boeing would sell a lot of the MAX. I’m going off memory, but I’m sure you can find the materials if you wanted.

Time will tell.
 
Our mutual friend is retired. The AC pilot is still active. FWIW, the expense of the training was noted. The duration also suggests a slow rotation through the ranks, but he made no comment on that.
Ah, sorry. I missed a change in personhood somewhere. My bad.

Thanks for clarifying it.
 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-47812225
A preliminary report into the crash of an Ethiopian Airlines plane last month says the aircraft nosedived several times before it crashed.

Pilots "repeatedly" followed procedures recommended by Boeing before the crash, according to the first official report into the disaster.

Despite their efforts, pilots "were not able to control the aircraft", Transport Minister Dagmawit Moges said.

Flight ET302 crashed after take-off from Addis Ababa, killing 157 people.

It was the second crash of a Boeing 737 Max aircraft in five months.

Last October, Lion Air flight JT 610 crashed into the sea near Indonesia killing all 189 people on board.

"The crew performed all the procedures repeatedly [that were] provided by the manufacturer but were not able to control the aircraft," Ms Dagmawit said in a news conference in Addis Ababa.

In a statement, the chief executive of Ethiopian Airlines, Tewolde GebreMariam, said he was "very proud" of the pilots' "high level of professional performance".

"It was very unfortunate they could not recover the airplane from the persistence of nosediving," the airline said in a statement.

The 737 Max family of aircraft was grounded following the Ethiopian Airlines crash, a move affecting more than 300 aircraft.

Investigators have focused their attention on the Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) - software designed to help prevent the 737 Max from stalling.


but sure, blame an "inexperienced" co-pilot.
 
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